

discourses, such as those of cyberspace, in order to map the complex ways in which power and knowledge intersect with these formulations. For example, feminist concerns, such as those voiced by Renate Klein (1999), as to the risks posed to women in their engagements with "techno-patriarchy" (210) of cyberspace can be assessed such that they are not premised on an essential alienation of women from technologies. While not denying the very real inequities operational in many practices associated with cyberspace, Deleuze and Guattari offer a more sophisticated and less teleological approach to analyzing the operations of power within such practices. If, following Deleuze, we approach technology, masculinity, femininity, technoscientific discourses, and military-industrial complexes as a series of interconnected assemblages, we can begin to delineate more clearly how such associations of masculinity with technologies of computing function and on what basis women are articulated as incompatible with those technologies. Through such a process, the very tangible operations of power should become apparent. Further, within such an analysis no individual technological formation is automatically foreclosed to women on the basis of an essential masculinity, but the relations and operations of power that render it oppressive to women can be more acutely discerned and its responses then formulated.

The third aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's model of assemblage that is of importance to feminists is the shift whereby structures of knowledge and power such as the economics of identity are repositioned as functional elements of an assemblage rather than as overarching and transcendent structures. It is on this basis that the above diagnostic exercise can proceed. Deleuze and Guattari begin with a different question—asking what an object, assemblage, practice, institution, discourse *does* rather than what it *is*. In making such an initial reorientation, our inquiries are no longer directed toward uncovering or defining an essential identity of these elements, which as we saw earlier most often leads to an installation of the epistemological structures of identity. Rather, it is to begin to (1) trace the processes through which identity is installed, and (2) consider what configurations of forces and objects are relegated to outside the limits of this identity that might suggest other formulations of bodies, subjects and technologies.

Thus in taking up a Deleuzian approach to cyberspace, two immediate tasks present themselves to feminists. First, we must understand cyberspace itself as not simply a technologically generated information space or place, but as a series of assemblages comprised of elements of the technical, social, discursive, material, and immaterial. It then becomes necessary to map such assemblages in order to discern how relations of power traverse them, how discourses and practices of femininity and masculinity interact with those of technology and technological artifacts, what hierarchies are functional, and through what particular and local linkages are bodies and technologies

articulated. Though this mapping process, a more nuanced and complex understanding of the operations of prevailing power relations and modes of knowledge will emerge. Such a mapping process will alert feminists to any exclusionary and oppressive practices, arrangements, and structures of knowledge that, while frequently circumscribing women's encounters with the technological, never completely foreclose transformative possibilities. Second, having traced out these fields of intersection among bodies, technologies, information flows, power relations, social institutions, and practices, we can begin to investigate the lines of flight and movements of differing that also always traverse an assemblage. It is these movements that are creative in their own right and that raise the possibility that new connections and configurations of technologies and bodies might generate a field within which new autonomous unrestricted articulations of woman might emerge.

**Notes**

1. For an broad introduction to corporeal feminism and the problematic of binary logic, see Irigaray 1985, Grosz 1994, and Kirby 1997.
2. Landmark examples of this position can be found in Stone 1991 and Rheingold 1991.

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